production. China hesitantly ''welcomed the deal as a step in the direction of a peaceful solution,'' 5 but Russia flatly declined the deal and discarded any link between the swap deal and the Security Council sanctions. France criticized the swap because it did not involve any progress on essential issuesÑit did not address nuclear weapons proliferation challenges, suspending sustained uranium enrichment activity on Iranian territory, or the issue of transparency. ''Let us not deceive ourselves, a solution to the [fuel] question . . . would do nothing to settle the problem posed by the Iranian nuclear program,'' French Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero maintained in a statement. 6 Turkish and
Brazilian officials considered the deal a success, however, and announced it as an accomplishment and a potential breakthrough. Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, stated that the agreement ''demonstrated once again that resolution could be reached through diplomacy. '' 7 In putting together the fuel-swap deal, Turkey, like Brazil, was trying to defend the autonomy of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to enrich uranium for producing electricity in their own territory and strengthen the right of NNWS to develop peaceful nuclear activities. Turkey also believed that finding a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue without consulting other powers about the negotiation process would burnish its credentials for membership in the elite club of ''responsible'' and ''world order-supporting states,'' 8 which Ankara views as important as Turkey seeks to assert its growing power both regionally and globally.
Turkey's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
Although Turkey has been part of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and endorsed international initiatives to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it has remained indifferent toward the Iranian nuclear program for many years. 9 Turkey signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 28, 1969 , and ratified it on April 17, 1980 . Ankara also played a role in international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, participating vigorously in the process of enhancing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) verification system to make safeguards inspections much more invasive after the 1991 Gulf War. It became part of the Additional Protocol (which enhanced the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities) by signing and ratifying the document in July 2000. 10 Turkey also is part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of nuclear supplier countries that attempts to curb nuclear proliferation by not selling dual-use technology (technology that can be used for both peaceful and military aims) to NNWS. Turkey's motivation for participating in nuclear non-proliferation efforts is largely due to its NATO membership (since 1952); Turkish territory is protected by a ''nuclear umbrella'' against attack from other countries, including Iran, so it has little military need to develop its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, Turkey possesses NATO tactical nuclear weapons and continues to deploy them on its territory (they are U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO's authority). Some were sent back to the United States after the end of the Cold War, but some are still deployed in Incirlik. 11 Turkey has security guarantees because NATO's Article V states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them all. Turkey is also seeking candidacy in the European Union, and accordingly has endorsed international policies intended to curb weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation in general, and nuclear non-proliferation in particular in the Middle East. 12 Given the protection accorded from the above organizations, 15 Turkey has positioned itself as an advocate of non-proliferation, while maintaining a strict interpretation of Article IV of the NPT, 16 which states that every member of the treaty has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities. Turkish officials have challenged any proposal intended to make it difficult for NPT parties to access nuclear technologies for the purpose of producing nuclear energy; they have perceived these propositions as a threat to their nuclear aspirations. 17 That is not to say that concerns about Iran's activities do not exist. Several interest groups and parliamentarians, including Faruk Logoglu (a former Turkish ambassador to the United States, the current deputy of the opposition party People's Republic Party (CHP), and a member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee) share the international community's concerns regarding Iran's intentions. Logoglu noted the ''disparity between the characteristics of Iran's nuclear program and its supposed peaceful purposes as well as the suitability of its facilities for making nuclear weapons. '' 19 The question is what Ankara should do about it? Although not explicitly voiced, Turkish actors are concerned that international proceedings against Iran might form a precedent for sanctions on states such as Turkey. 20 Other Turkish officials feel that sanctions would only delay Iran's nuclear capability to produce a weapon, not discourage its nuclear ambitions. Turkish trade with Iran is also a factor. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, and the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey have become fundamental actors in Turkey's foreign-policymaking. Turkish trade with Iran has increased due to these actors' preferences, and Turkey's pro-Iran position on the Iranian nuclear program, as well as its increasing aspiration to play a constructive role as a mediating regional power, can be connected to the influence of these organizations. 21 The supply of energy has been a main component of Turkish -Iranian relations as well. In July 1996, under Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the two countries signed a $23 billion natural gas deal. In a RAND report, analyst F. Stephen Larrabee confirmed that since then, energy trade interactions between Ankara and Tehran have continued to increase gradually. 22 Turkey imports 30 percent of its gas from Iran and cannot afford detached relations with a prospective market, which is probably what would happen if Turkey chose to carry out U.S. unilateral sanctions and pressured Iran not to enrich uranium in its territory. 23 The AKP's Islamic roots also have played a part in Turkey's policy. Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu has noted that ''the debateÑconcerning the Iranian nuclear programÑis rather emotional, reactive to daily events, and also partly ideological.'' 24 For Turkish foreign policymakers, the ''Muslim world'' is an autonomous and peculiar geopolitical region where Turkey could be influential diplomatically and assume a primary role. Prime Minister Erdogan has stated that if all obstacles could be removed, the world's 57 Muslim countries would be able to form a self-sufficient group. 25 
Iran has perceived
Turkey as not only a competitor, but a threat.
Moreover, Turkey has not favored sanctions against Iran. This is mainly because Turkey wants to pursue a multi-dimensional and multi-track foreign policy, 33 one that can boast of ''zero problems with neighbors.'' This concept derives from Davutoglu's book, Strategic Depth, which promotes Turkish engagement with the region under the idea that Turkey is a key fulcrum between the East and the West. Such a policy would hesitate to provoke a neighbor, like Iran, with harsh sanctions. Moreover, Turkey imports approximately 200,000 barrels per day of oil from Iran, which represents over 7 percent of Iran's oil exports, and it has gradually increased its imports from Iran since the AKP administration came to power. Ankara regards Tehran not only as a significant neighbor but also an important factor in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Caucasus. In this regard, Turkey wanted to help resolve conflicting views and disagreements over Iran's nuclear program through engagement and dialogue, not coercion and sanctions, in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. Turkey's objective was to convince Iran to respond fully to the concerns of the international community. By brokering the fuel-swap deal, Turkey attempted to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue in order to evade a military attack on Iran.
Turkey's involvement in the 2010 Tehran Declaration came under fire internationally, which initially surprised Ankara. From Turkey's (or at least the AKP's) point of view, its involvement was simply intended to maintain peace and stability, avoid conflict, and fend off international sanctions that would also damage Turkish commercial interests with Iran. Turkey also wished to consolidate its position as a strong regional player in resolving disputes.
Turkish diplomats maintained that Brazilian officials were trying to conclude a deal parallel to Turkish efforts, so they decided to join forces. 34 Like Brazil, Turkey desired ''to raise its status in the eyes of the international community.'' 35 Also, both the Turks and the Brazilians believe that institutions such as the Security Council ''reflect asymmetries in the distribution of power in the international system,'' 36 so it should not have come a surprise that the two decided to cooperate and circumvent the UNSC efforts. While all these factors contributed to its stance, however, Turkey's principal motivations were its past nuclear non-proliferation policy and its future prospects as a regional mediator. To achieve a peaceful settlement on Iran's nuclear file, Turkish officials proclaimed that Turkey and Brazil ''concluded the 'Tehran Joint Declaration' that was based on initial proposals of the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the U.S.'' 37 Turkish officials claimed that they ''had worked tirelessly to effectively address this issue in seamless consultation with the P5'1 and Iran.'' 38 Even though Security Council member states said that the fuel-swap deal would not eradicate concerns about the Iranian nuclear program because it would not prevent Iranian uranium enrichment, Turkish and Brazilian officials argued that
Aylin Gürzel it at least offered a confidence-building measure from which to reconstruct more than five years of failed negotiations with Iran. A similar proposal to the fuel-swap deal, led by the Vienna Group (France, Russia, the United States, and the IAEA), had failed in 2009; therefore not many members of the Security Council were optimistic about the capability of Prime Minister Erdogan and then-Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to achieve a comprehensive agreement with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about going further with the Tehran Agreement. Since Tehran and the permanent Security Council members mistrusted each other, Iran was much more comfortable negotiating with Turkey and Brazil, and thus tried to bolster its relations with the two significant intermediate states that were then non-permanent members of the Security Council. 39 Although Iran was still uncertain about Turkish motivations, it conceded that Ankara was genuinely trying to grow gradually independent from Washington. Iran was also aware that Turkey aspired to prevent new sanctions that would negatively affect its own interests. Turkey and Brazil's strategy can be summarized as seeking greater global influence, particularly in the Middle East, through active diplomacy. To that end, the fuel-swap deal was viewed in Ankara as a success.
What Will Ankara Do Next?
Ultimately, the fuel-swap deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil was not a comprehensive solution to Iran's nuclear program because it did not address interrupting Iranian production of uranium enriched to 20 percent. Iran did indeed agree to deposit 1,200 kilograms of LEU in Turkey, but it would remain the property of Iran, and Iranian officials could request the return of its LEU for any reason if they desired to do so. 40 The main problem with the deal was that it did not fundamentally change Iran's nuclear program. 41 But Turkey never intended it to achieve that ultimate objective; it was merely a first step toward that end. Nevertheless, numerous Turkish parliamentarians and diplomats have acknowledged the problems regarding the deal, 42 and they have recognized the coordination problems with the United States and other Western powers during the negotiations with Tehran. In terms of Ankara's relations with the United States, President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan have apparently been in close contact since January 2011. The failure of the fuel-swap deal may have led the two governments to increase their communication to help ensure that another attempt at resolution succeeds. Coordination problems will try to be eliminated in future efforts. 43 Moving forward, the dynamics of overall Turkish -Iranian relations will be crucial in curbing nuclear proliferation and controlling Iran's nuclear program.
Ever since the two countries' border was delineated in 1639, the Turkish -Iranian relationship has been ''nuanced and multifaceted and does not hinge on any single issue, but is instead an amalgamation of sometimes competing, sometimes common interests.'' 44 Former AKP parliamentarian Murat Mercan, also the former president of the Council of European Parliamentary Assembly, contends that the two countries managed to coexist rather peacefully due to the isolation from each other's economic and political affairs for almost four centuries. But problems surfaced when the AKP government came into power and tried to bolster its relations with the Iranian regime. 46 Iranian officials explicitly told the AKP parliamentarians that they realized that Turkey was collaborating with American officials behind closed doors.
47
It seems that Ankara has yet to appreciate the significance of how its actions are perceived by the international community as well. Although not a party in the dispute between the international community and Iran, Turkey is affected by the repercussions of any developments in it. This gives Turkey a vested interest in the settlement's progress (or lack thereof). Subsequently, Ankara's impartiality is questionable to the international community, no matter how much Turkish policymakers insist otherwise. 48 Although Ankara voted against the Security Council resolution that imposed sanctions on Iran in July 2010, Iran is still concerned about the agreement signed on September 15, 2011, between Turkey and the United States to station a U.S. missile-defense radar in Kurecik, which lies in Turkey's Malatya provinceÑsome
Differences with
Iran will make it difficult for Turkey to play an active role in negotiations.
700 kilometers west of the Iranian border. AKP parliamentarian Hasan Fehmi Kinay was quick to clarify that the Kurecik radar station had been in use previously, and will merely begin functioning again. 49 53 Anything else, from the perspective of these observers, will diminish international unity and allow the Iranian regime to buy even more time. Former European Commissioner Gunter Verheugen stresses that the recent IAEA report made public on November 8, 2011, ''is alarming and something needs to be done, '' 54 and argues that the best option is for Ankara to join the multilateral efforts. It is understandable, however, that the AKP leadership would rather continue along the path of dialogue, facilitation, and mediation. In order to achieve its desired influence in the region, Turkey must prove its will and ability to settle disputes in its neighborhood, particularly the Iranian nuclear dispute. But Turkey has also realized that active diplomacy is not enough, and zero problems with neighbors is not feasibleÑtherefore it has shifted its foreign policy. Turkey has drawn some lessons from its past experiences with Iran, and after some resistance, it has decided to look for other energy Turkey may need to consider joining sanctions if it desires a non-military solution to the problem.
resources. 55 In line with this decision, in March 2012 Turkish officials announced that ''it was reducing oil imports from Iran by 20 percent.'' 56 The AKP government is diversifying energy supplies in the case of a disruption of Iranian oil production. 57 Turkey also intends ''to build up northern Iraq's energy infrastructure to expand its influence in Iraq and counter Iran.'' 58 Currently, AKP parliamentarians are preparing for any eventuality, including the possibility of a military strike on Iran. Nevertheless, through continuing negotiations, Turkish policymakers, especially Foreign Minister Davutoglu, are dedicated to solving the Iranian nuclear file in Istanbul this year.
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